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IMPORTANCE Beginning in fiscal year 2019, Medicare’s Hospital Readmissions Reduction

Program (HRRP) stratifies hospitals into 5 peer groups based on the proportion of each
hospital’s patient population that is dually enrolled in Medicare and Medicaid. The effect of
this policy change is largely unknown.
OBJECTIVE To identify hospital and state characteristics associated with changes in
HRRP-related performance and penalties after stratification.
DESIGN, SETTING, AND PARTICIPANTS A cross-sectional analysis was performed of all 3049
hospitals participating in the HRRP in fiscal years 2018 and 2019, using publicly available data
on hospital penalties, merged with information on hospital characteristics and state Medicaid
eligibility cutoffs.
EXPOSURES The HRRP, under the 2018 traditional method and the 2019 stratification

method.
MAIN OUTCOMES AND MEASURES Performance on readmissions, as measured by the excess
readmissions ratio, and penalties under the HRRP both in relative percentage change and in
absolute dollars.
RESULTS The study sample included 3049 hospitals. The mean proportion of dually enrolled
beneficiaries ranged from 9.5% in the lowest quintile to 44.7% in the highest quintile. At the
hospital level, changes in penalties ranged from an increase of $225 000 to a decrease of
more than $436 000 after stratification. In total, hospitals in the lowest quintile of dual
enrollment saw an increase of $12 330 157 in penalties, while those in the highest quintile of
dual enrollment saw a decrease of $22 445 644. Teaching hospitals (odds ratio [OR], 2.13;
95% CI, 1.76-2.57; P < .001) and large hospitals (OR, 1.51; 95% CI, 1.22-1.86; P < .001) had
higher odds of receiving a reduced penalty. Not-for-profit hospitals (OR, 0.64; 95% CI,
0.52-0.80; P < .001) were less likely to have a penalty reduction than for-profit hospitals, and
hospitals in the Midwest (OR, 0.44; 95% CI, 0.34-0.57; P < .001) and South (OR, 0.42; 95%
CI, 0.30-0.57; P < .001) were less likely to do so than hospitals in the Northeast. Hospitals
with patients from the most disadvantaged neighborhoods (OR, 2.62; 95% CI, 2.03-3.38;
P < .001) and those with the highest proportion of beneficiaries with disabilities (OR, 3.12;
95% CI, 2.50-3.90; P < .001) were markedly more likely to see a reduction in penalties, as
were hospitals in states with the highest Medicaid eligibility cutoffs (OR, 1.79; 95% CI,
1.50-2.14; P < .001).
CONCLUSIONS AND RELEVANCE Stratification of the hospitals under the HRRP was associated
with a significant shift in penalties for excess readmissions. Policymakers should monitor the
association of this change with readmission rates as well as hospital financial performance as
the policy is fully implemented.
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M

edicare’s Hospital Readmissions Reduction Program (HRRP) is a mandatory pay-for-performance
program that evaluates hospitals on their 30-day
readmission rates for specified conditions and procedures.1
Hospitals with higher than expected readmission rates are
assessed a financial penalty of up to 3% of Medicare payments; in 2018, more than 80% of hospitals were penalized for
their readmission rates.2 Since the initial announcement of the
HRRP in 2012, readmission rates have fallen both for targeted
conditions and overall, although most of the decline happened prior to the program’s actual implementation and readmission rates have leveled off since 2014.3
There has been significant controversy surrounding the
HRRP, particularly with respect to whether readmission performance, which is adjusted for medical risk factors, should also
be adjusted for social risk factors. The association between readmission rates and social risk factors, including race and
ethnicity, income, and educational level, is well established,4-10
and prior studies have shown that hospitals serving a greater
proportion of patients with these risk factors are penalized at a
higher rate.11-14 Consequently, many stakeholders have argued
that social risk should be taken into account in the HRRP. In
response, Congress passed the 21st Century Cures Act in 2016,15
which included a directive to Medicare to account for differences in the prevalence of poverty (as measured by dual enrollment in Medicare and Medicaid) between hospitals when
assessing hospital performance in the HRRP.
Thus, beginning in fiscal year 2019, hospital performance in the HRRP has been stratified into peer group quintiles by the proportion of patients dually enrolled in Medicare
and Medicaid, such that hospitals are evaluated relative to others with similar poverty levels in their Medicare patient populations. Although the overall program must remain budget
neutral by statute, there is the potential for significant redistribution of penalty dollars as a result. This change has been
anticipated by stakeholders across the academic, hospital, and
policy communities, but its actual effect is largely unknown.
Therefore, we set out to investigate the association of stratification under the updated rule with hospital performance
and penalty assessment. We had 2 main research questions:
first, how did hospital structural characteristics, patient mix
characteristics, and geographical characteristics vary across
strata, and second, what were the hospital characteristics associated with changes in HRRP performance and penalties
after stratification, including the characteristics listed above
as well as state-level variations in Medicaid eligibility?

Methods
Data
We used several sources of publicly available data on hospital
characteristics, readmission rates, patient neighborhood characteristics, and state Medicaid eligibility to estimate HRRP
penalties before and after stratification. We compiled hospital characteristics, readmission rates, and base operating diagnosis-related group (DRG) payments using the Centers for
Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) Impact Files and Read770

Key Points
Question What was the association of Medicare’s recent change
to the Hospital Readmissions Reduction Program, in which
hospitals are judged within 5 peer groups based on the proportion
of their patients who are dually enrolled in Medicare and Medicaid,
with changes in performance and penalties after stratification?
Findings In this cross-sectional study, hospitals in the lowest
quintile of dual enrollment saw an increase of $12.3 million in
penalties, while those in the highest quintile of dual enrollment
saw a decrease of $22.4 million. Large hospitals, teaching
hospitals, hospitals in the most disadvantaged neighborhoods,
and those with the highest proportion of beneficiaries with
disabilities were markedly more likely to see a reduction in
penalties, as were hospitals in states with higher Medicaid
eligibility cutoffs.
Meaning Stratification of hospitals by the Hospital Readmissions
Reduction Program was associated with a significant shift in
hospital penalties for excess readmissions.

missions Supplemental Files for the final and proposed Inpatient Prospective Payment System rules for fiscal years 2018
and 2019. The performance periods contained in the Readmissions Supplemental Files are July 1, 2013, through June 30,
2016, for payment adjustments in fiscal year 2018, and July 1,
2014, through June 30, 2017, for payment adjustments in
fiscal year 2019. We used the Hospital Compare General Information File for the performance period ending June 30,
2016, to identify state and profit status (not for profit, for profit,
and public). This study was approved by the Henry Ford
Hospital Institutional Review Board (IRB 11064). Informed consent was waived because of the deidentified nature of the data.
We measured patient neighborhood characteristics by joining Area Deprivation Indices for 9-digit zip codes16 with CMS
2015 100% Inpatient Research Identifiable Files. Each hospital’s proportion of Medicare patients with disability was calculated by joining 2015 Research Identifiable File data with CMS
Master Beneficiary Summary File data on the original reason
for Medicare eligibility. We obtained information on state Medicaid eligibility for the aged, blind, and disabled and Medicaid expansion status using 2017 State Health Facts data from
the Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation.

Covariates
We evaluated the outcome of HRRP stratification by hospital
structural characteristics, geographical characteristics, patient mix characteristics, and state Medicaid eligibility
characteristics. Structural characteristics included teaching
status, size, and ownership. We evaluated geographical characteristics using CMS regions and rural vs urban location. Patient characteristics included quintiles of Area Deprivation Index (calculated using the mean of patients’ neighborhood
disadvantage for Medicare fee-for-service inpatient discharges during 2015), case mix index (mean DRG weight of inpatient discharges), proportion of patients originally eligible
for Medicare because of disability, and proportion of patients
dually eligible for Medicare and Medicaid, which is used to
create the comparative peer groupings under the stratified
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Table 1. Hospital Characteristics and Performance by Strata Under the Hospital Readmissions Reduction Program
Peer Group (Dual Enrollment, %)a
Characteristic

Quintile 1
(0.2%-13.7%)

Quintile 2
(13.7%-18.4%)

Quintile 3
(18.4%-23.2%)

Quintile 4
(23.2%-31.0%)

Quintile 5
(31.0%-93.8%)

Total

No. (%) of hospitals

577 (18.9)

618 (20.3)

621 (20.4)

629 (20.6)

604 (19.8)

3049

Proportion of patients with dual
enrollment, mean

9.5

16.1

20.7

26.7

44.7

23.6

Mean excess readmission ratio

0.981

0.996

0.998

1.007

1.024

1.001

Structural characteristics, %
Nonteaching

435 (21.8)

400 (20.1)

378 (19.0)

408 (20.5)

371 (18.6)

1992

Teaching

142 (13.4)

218 (20.6)

243 (23.0)

221 (20.9)

233 (22.0)

1057

Small

245 (25.1)

173 (17.7)

182 (18.6)

179 (18.3)

199 (20.3)

978

Medium

178 (18.2)

196 (20.0)

199 (20.3)

206 (21.0)

201 (20.5)

980

Large

154 (14.1)

249 (22.8)

240 (22.0)

244 (22.4)

204 (18.7)

1091

For profit

197 (28.8)

125 (18.2)

90 (13.1)

111 (16.2)

162 (23.6)

685

Public

55 (11.2)

72 (14.7)

110 (22.5)

116 (23.7)

136 (27.8)

489

Not for profit

325 (17.3)

421 (22.5)

421 (22.5)

402 (21.4)

306 (16.3)

1875

Northeast

49 (10.2)

85 (17.7)

98 (20.4)

122 (25.4)

126 (26.3)

480

Midwest

134 (18.5)

169 (23.3)

193 (26.6)

145 (20.0)

85 (11.7)

726

South

284 (22.4)

262 (20.7)

250 (19.7)

270 (21.3)

202 (15.9)

1268

West

110 (19.1)

102 (17.7)

80 (13.9)

92 (16.0)

191 (33.2)

575

Urban

528 (23.1)

518 (22.7)

429 (18.8)

378 (16.5)

432 (18.9)

2285

Rural

49 (6.4)

100 (13.1)

192 (25.1)

251 (32.9)

172 (22.5)

764

ADI quintile 5

10 (1.6)

34 (5.6)

127 (20.8)

218 (35.7)

221 (36.2)

610

CMI quintile 5

222 (36.4)

110 (18.0)

115 (18.9)

89 (14.6)

74 (12.1)

610

Disability quintile 5

8 (1.3)

42 (6.9)

97 (15.9)

203 (33.3)

260 (42.6)

610

Aged, blind, and disabled
eligible at 52%-74% FPL

298 (22.9)

323 (24.8)

288 (22.1)

251 (19.2)

144 (11.0)

1304

Aged, blind, and disabled
eligible at 80%-88% FPL

106 (20.5)

107 (20.7)

96 (18.6)

112 (21.7)

95 (18.4)

516

Aged, blind, and disabled
eligible at 100% FPL

173 (14.1)

188 (15.3)

237 (19.3)

266 (21.6)

365 (29.7)

1229

Nonexpansion state

317 (25.5)

272 (21.9)

239 (19.2)

237 (19.1)

178 (14.3)

1243

Expansion state

260 (14.4)

346 (19.2)

382 (21.2)

392 (21.7)

426 (23.6)

1806

Geographical characteristics, %

Patient characteristics, %

State Medicaid eligibility cutoffs, %

Abbreviations: ADI, Area Deprivation Index; CMI, case mix index; FPL, federal
poverty level.
a

Quintiles are not even because the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services

HRRP method. We evaluated state Medicaid eligibility characteristics using 3 levels of relative eligibility cutoffs for beneficiaries aged 65 years or older in addition to state decisions
on Medicaid expansion.

Outcomes
Our primary outcome was the difference in penalties between the traditional and stratified assessments of HRRP penalties in fiscal years 2018 and 2019, in relative (percentage
change) and absolute (dollars) terms, at the hospital level. We
also examined these outcomes at the stratum level (aggregating within each quintile of dual enrollment), state level, and
across hospital characteristics.

Statistical Analysis
We described hospital structural characteristics, geographical characteristics, and patient characteristics as well as state
jamainternalmedicine.com

assigns quintiles across all hospitals with any readmissions, regardless of
whether the hospital is eligible for a Hospital Readmissions Reduction Program
assessment.

Medicaid eligibility cutoffs by strata of dual enrollment. We
then examined changes in penalties at the hospital level,
aggregated to the stratum, characteristic, and state levels,
both in relative and absolute terms. We used logistic regression to calculate the odds of receiving a lower penalty under
stratification associated with each of the characteristics
listed.
We analyzed the outcome of stratification by calculating
penalty amounts under the traditional and stratified HRRP formulas using base operating DRG payments from the 2019 Inpatient Prospective Payment System proposed rule applied to
the payment adjustment factors, peer group assignments, DRG
weights, and budget neutrality modifier published in the 2019
final rule. This approach allowed us to draw comparisons between the expected penalty assessments during the first year
of stratification and the simulated penalty assessments that
would have been realized without stratification. As a robust(Reprinted) JAMA Internal Medicine June 2019 Volume 179, Number 6
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Table 2. Mean Change in Penalties Under Stratification
by Hospital Characteristics
Hospital Readmissions
Reduction Program, $

Results

Characteristic

Traditional

Stratified

Change, P
%
Value

Overall

176 417

176 419

0.00

>.99

Nonteaching

117 598

119 619

1.72

.02

Teaching

287 268

283 461

−1.33

.07

Small

95 594

95 602

0.01

.99

Medium

151 794

153 387

1.05

.15

Large

270 988

269 553

−0.53

.46

For profit

166 075

164 711

−0.82

.26

Public

108 757

108 559

−0.18

.80

Not for profit

197 842

198 394

0.28

.70

Northeast

319 079

306 996

−3.79

<.001

Midwest

133 168

136 784

2.72

.001

South

169 812

176 237

3.78

<.001

West

126 499

117 858

−6.83

<.001

Urban

216 924

217 473

0.25

.72

Rural

55 268

53 633

−2.96

<.001

ADI quintile 5

99 635

94 530

−5.12

<.001

CMI quintile 5

227 802

230 368

1.13

.13

Disability quintile 5

135 693

126 217

−6.98

<.001

Aged, blind, and
disabled eligible at
52%-74% FPL

128 703

135 891

5.58

<.001

Aged, blind, and
disabled eligible at
80%-88% FPL

271 609

271 271

−0.12

.86

Aged, blind, and
disabled eligible at
100% FPL

187 077

179 596

−4.00

<.001

Nonexpansion state

152 086

157 680

3.68

<.001

Expansion state

193 164

189 316

−1.99

.01

Structural characteristics

Geographical
characteristics

Patient characteristics

State Medicaid eligibility
cutoffs

Abbreviations: ADI, Area Deprivation Index; CMI, case mix index; FPL, federal
poverty level.

ness check, we also compared fiscal year 2018 penalties under the prior policy specifications with simulated 2018 penalties under stratified policy specifications extrapolated from
final and proposed rule data from fiscal years 2018 and 2019
(results of the simulated analysis for 2018 are included in
eTables 1, 3, and 4 and the eFigure in the Supplement). In both
analyses, only the benchmarks to which hospitals’ performance were compared changed from one scenario to the next,
while the actual underlying excess readmission ratios, base
operating payments, and DRG weights were held constant
during each year.
All analyses were conducted using SAS, version 9.4 (SAS
Institute Inc). We considered a 2-tailed P < .05 to be statistically significant.
772

Hospital Characteristics
There were 3049 hospitals in our sample (Table 1). The
mean proportion of dually enrolled beneficiaries ranged
from 9.5% in the lowest quintile to 44.7% in the highest
quintile. The mean excess readmission ratio across all 6
measures included in the HRRP was lowest in the lowest
quintile of dual enrollment (0.981, representing readmission
rates 1.9% lower than expected based on current riskstandardization methods) and was highest in the highest
quintile of dual enrollment (1.024, representing readmission
rates 2.4% higher than expected). Structural characteristics,
geographical characteristics, and patient characteristics
differed across strata, as did state Medicaid eligibility cutoffs.
For example, 233 of 1057 teaching hospitals (22.0%)
were in the highest quintile of dual enrollment, compared
with 371 of 1992 nonteaching hospitals (18.6%). Public hospitals (136 of 489 [27.8%] in the highest quintile), hospitals in
the Northeast (126 of 480 [26.3%] in the highest quintile) and
West (191 of 575 [33.2%] in the highest quintile), and rural
hospitals (172 of 764 [22.5%] in the highest quintile) were
also more likely to be in the group with the highest dual
enrollment.
Hospitals in the highest quintile of mean neighborhood
disadvantage and those in the highest quintile of proportion
of patients qualified for Medicare on the basis of disability
were also much more often in the group with the highest
dual enrollment (Table 1). Hospitals with the highest (most
complex) case mix index, however, were underrepresented
in the group with the highest dual enrollment, with only 74
of 610 hospitals (12.1%) falling into the stratum with the
highest dual enrollment. Hospitals located in states with
the highest Medicaid eligibility cutoffs were also much
more likely to be in the highest quintile of dual enrollment,
as were hospitals located in Medicaid expansion states.
These patterns were similar when we compared 2018 results
with simulated stratified 2018 results (eTable 1 in the
Supplement).

Change in Penalties by Stratum
We estimated the mean penalties in 2019 to be $176 400
per hospital under both stratification and traditional policy
specifications, given the overall budget neutrality of the
program (a modest discrepancy in Table 2 is due to rounding). However, changes in penalties for individual hospitals
ranged from an increase of just above $225 000 to a decrease
of more than $436 000, and varied significantly by stratum
as per program design (Figure 1A). In total, hospitals in the
lowest quintile of dual enrollment saw an increase of
$12 330 157 in penalties; quintile 2, an increase of $9 637 593;
quintile 3, an increase of $5 850 547; and quintile 4, a
decrease of $5 369 230, while those in the highest quintile of
dual enrollment saw a decrease of $22 445 644 (Figure 1B).
These patterns were similar when we compared 2018
results with simulated stratified 2018 results (eFigure in the
Supplement).
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Odds of Receiving Reduced Penalties
by Hospital Characteristics
When we modeled the odds of receiving a reduced penalty
by hospital characteristics (Table 3), we found that teaching
hospitals (odds ratio [OR], 2.13; 95% CI, 1.76-2.57; P < .001)
and large hospitals (OR, 1.51; 95% CI, 1.22-1.86; P < .001) had
higher odds of reduction. Not-for-profit hospitals (OR, 0.64;
95% CI, 0.52-0.80; P < .001) were less likely to have a penalty reduction than were for-profit hospitals, and hospitals
in the Midwest (OR, 0.44; 95% CI, 0.34-0.57; P < .001) and
South (OR, 0.42; 95% CI, 0.30-0.57; P < .001) were less likely
to do so than hospitals in the Northeast. Hospitals with
patients from the most disadvantaged neighborhoods (OR,
2.62; 95% CI, 2.03-3.38; P < .001) and those with the highest
proportion of beneficiaries with disabilities (OR, 3.12; 95%
CI, 2.50-3.90; P < .001) were markedly more likely to see a
reduction in penalties, as were hospitals in states with the
highest Medicaid eligibility cutoffs (OR, 1.79; 95% CI, 1.502.14; P < .001). These patterns were similar when we compared 2018 results with simulated stratified 2018 results
(eTable 4 in the Supplement).

Discussion
We found that stratification of the HRRP as mandated by the
21st Century Cures Act was associated with a significant shift
in penalties, ranging from an increase of just above $225 000
to a decrease of more than $436 000 at the hospital level. These
outcomes varied by hospital characteristics and, notably, by
state Medicaid eligibility cutoffs.
jamainternalmedicine.com

A Estimated per-hospital HRRP penalty changes by quintile

300 000
200 000
100 000

Penalty Change, $

Hospital teaching status, size, and ownership were not significantly associated with changes in mean penalty amount
(Table 2). Hospitals in the Northeast and West saw their penalties reduced significantly (Northeast, −3.79%; and West,
−6.83%), while those in the Midwest and South saw them rise
(Midwest, 2.72%; and South, 3.78%). Significant reductions in
penalties were also seen for hospitals with the most patients
living in highly disadvantaged neighborhoods (−5.12%) and
those with the highest proportion of disabled beneficiaries
(−6.98%).
States with higher Medicaid eligibility cutoffs, compared
with those with lower eligibility cutoffs, had significant reductions in penalties (hospitals in states with eligibility starting at 100% of the federal poverty level, −4.00%; hospitals in
states with eligibility starting at 52% to 74% of the federal poverty level, 5.58%) (Table 2 and Figure 2). On a relative basis,
California saw the greatest reduction in penalties (−14.2%) and
South Dakota saw the greatest increase (37.3%). On an absolute basis, California saw the greatest monetary reduction
(−$6 587 964), while Florida saw the greatest increase
($2 524 904) (Figure 2; eTable 2 in the Supplement). These patterns were similar when we compared traditional results with
simulated stratified results for fiscal year 2018 (eTable 3 in the
Supplement).

Figure 1. Change in Hospital Readmissions Reduction Program (HRRP)
Penalties Under Stratification by Stratum

0
–100 000
–200 000
–300 000
–400 000
–500 000
1

2

3

4

5

Quintile
B

Estimated total HRRP penalty changes by quintile and condition
15 000 000
10 000 000
5 000 000

Penalty Change, $

Change in Penalties by Hospital Characteristics
and Geography

Original Investigation Research

0
–5 000 000
–10 000 000
–15 000 000

AMI

PN

CABG
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COPD

TJR

–20 000 000
–25 000 000
1

2

3

4

5

Quintile

A, Estimated per-hospital HRRP penalty changes with stratification by dually
eligible quintile peer groups (n = 3049). The orange crosses indicate the mean
value, the horizontal lines outside the boxes are the 25th and 75th percentiles,
and the horizontal lines inside the boxes are the median. B, Total estimated
HRRP penalty changes with stratification by dually eligible quintile peer groups
and condition. AMI indicates acute myocardial infarction; CABG, coronary artery
bypass grafting; COPD, chronic obstructive pulmonary disease; HF, heart failure;
PN, pneumonia; and TJR, total joint replacement.

Stratification of the HRRP led to significant changes in penalties, particularly for hospitals in the highest quintile of dual
enrollment, in which the benchmark shifted the most under
this approach. Although for many hospitals the absolute dollar change was quite small, there were hospitals for which the
change was large and likely financially meaningful. This finding is in contrast to 1 prior report suggesting that accounting
for social risk in the HRRP would have little association with
hospital performance or penalties, although that report did not
examine absolute changes in penalty dollar amounts.17
At the state level, the monetary shift was even more striking, with California hospitals receiving more than $6.5 million less in penalties and Florida hospitals receiving $2.5 million more in penalties. These state-level shifts were correlated
with state Medicaid eligibility cutoffs, with states with higher
cutoffs having a greater reduction in penalties than those with
lower cutoffs. Although Medicaid eligibility for individuals
(Reprinted) JAMA Internal Medicine June 2019 Volume 179, Number 6
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Figure 2. Geographical Distribution of Penalty Changes
A State Medicaid generosity for the aged population

B

Percentage of hospitals with lower penalties

Dual eligibility threshold, %

Percent lower penalty

52 to 74 FPL

0 to 9.9

80 to 88 FPL

10.0 to 20.0

100 FPLa

20.1 to 35.0

MD HRRP exempt

35.1 to 50.0
50.1 to 71.4a
MD HRRP exempt

C

D HRRP penalty change (by total state dollars)

HRRP penalty change (by percentage)

Percent change

774

Net change in penalty, $

–14.2 to –10.0a

–6 587 964 to –1 500 000

–9.9 to 0

–1 499 999 to 0a

0.1 to 5.0

1 to 250 000

5.1 to 10.0

250 001 to 500 000

10.1 to 37.3

500 001 to 2 524 904

MD HRRP exempt

MD HRRP exempt

A, State Medicaid eligibility cutoffs for the aged population. B, Percentage of
hospitals with lower penalties. C, Hospital Readmissions Reduction Program
(HRRP) penalty change by percentage. D, HRRP penalty change by total state

a

dollars. FPL indicates federal poverty level; MD, Maryland.

older than 65 years is set based on the federal standard for receipt of Supplemental Security Income for many states, there
are 9 states with 209b waivers that have stricter eligibility standards than Supplemental Security Income, and 7 additional
states that use Supplemental Security Income as the eligibility criteria but make their own determinations rather than using
the federal government’s determinations.18 Because hospitals are assigned to peer group strata based on their propor-

tion of patients who are Medicaid beneficiaries, states that enroll individuals in Medicaid at a higher income threshold would
be categorized in a higher stratum even with the same underlying patient population in terms of poverty.
Although the decision to stratify the HRRP was met with
approval from many stakeholders, including clinicians and
hospital organizations, there are pros and cons to this approach. As is evident from the data in Table 1, because hospi-

Also includes Washington, DC.

JAMA Internal Medicine June 2019 Volume 179, Number 6 (Reprinted)

© 2019 American Medical Association. All rights reserved.

Downloaded From: https://jamanetwork.com/ by a Henry Ford Health System User on 12/09/2019

jamainternalmedicine.com

Dual Enrollment Status and Financial Penalties in the Hospital Readmissions Reduction Program

Table 3. Odds of Receiving a Reduced Penalty Under Stratification
Characteristic

Hospitals With
Lower Penalty, %

OR (95% CI)

P
Value

Overall

1126 (36.9)

NA

NA

Nonteaching

660 (33.1)

1 [Reference]

Teaching

466 (44.1)

2.13
(1.76-2.57)

Small

330 (33.7)

1 [Reference]

Medium

363 (37.0)

1.29
(1.05-1.58)

.02

Large

433 (39.7)

1.51
(1.22-1.86)

<.001

For profit

267 (39.0)

1 [Reference]

Public

199 (40.7)

0.76
(0.59-1.00)

.047

Not for profit

660 (35.2)

0.64
(0.52-0.80)

<.001

Northeast

234 (48.8)

1 [Reference]

Midwest

224 (30.9)

0.44
(0.34-0.57)

<.001

South

427 (33.7)

0.42
(0.30-0.57)

<.001

West

241 (41.9)

0.81
(0.62-1.06)

.12

Urban

792 (34.7)

1 [Reference]

Rural

334 (43.7)

1.01
(0.80-1.27)

ADI quintiles 1-4

784 (32.1)

1 [Reference]

ADI quintile 5

342 (56.1)

2.62
(2.03-3.38)

CMI quintiles 1-4

950 (39.0)

1 [Reference]

CMI quintile 5

176 (28.9)

0.60
(0.48-0.75)

Disability quintiles 1-4

746 (30.6)

1 [Reference]

Disability quintile 5

380 (62.3)

3.12
(2.50-3.90)

Aged, blind, and disabled
eligible at 52%-74% FPL

375 (28.8)

1 [Reference]

Aged, blind, and disabled
eligible at 80%-88% FPL

194 (37.6)

1 [Reference]

Aged, blind, and disabled
eligible at 100% FPL

557 (45.3)

1.79
(1.50-2.14)

Nonexpansion state

381 (30.7)

1 [Reference]

Expansion state

745 (41.3)

1.13
(0.90-1.41)

Structural characteristics

<.001

Geographical characteristics

.96

Patient characteristics

<.001

<.001

<.001

State Medicaid eligibility
cutoffs

<.001

Original Investigation Research

that social risk factors are associated with readmission
rates,4-6,11,19,20 taking these factors into account in some
manner is certainly appropriate. However, some have argued
that direct adjustment, which would account for only the
within-hospital component of the effect of a social risk factor,
would have been a better approach than stratification. The
latter approach gives hospitals credit for both the withinhospital and between-hospital differences in performance
and, thus, has a greater effect than direct adjustment on performance assessment.6
Prior studies have shown that racial disparities in readmissions have begun to decrease under the HRRP.21 Opponents of accounting for social risk in readmission policy have
argued that doing so may reduce hospitals’ incentive to improve and ultimately lead to another increase in disparities.22
On the other hand, high penalties may have impeded hospitals’ efforts to reduce readmissions by reducing resources in
already constrained environments, so accounting for social risk
and consequently reducing penalties could also plausibly lead
to further improvements at safety-net hospitals. The association of this modification with the HRRP should be tracked
closely, going forward.
To our knowledge, this is the first analysis examining the
outcome of HRRP stratification under the 21st Century Cures
Act. However, prior reports, including those from the Office
of the Assistant Secretary for Planning and Evaluation within
the US Department of Health and Human Services6 and from
the Medicare Payment Advisory Commission, have shown
similar results in simulation work that preceded and informed this policy change.

Limitations
There are some limitations to our study. First, our findings represent the first year of the new policy approach. As hospitals
are improving and worsening from year to year, the true outcome of the policy may change over time. Second, we relied
on publicly released data from CMS and did not recalculate hospital performance directly. Finally, our estimates for 2019 penalties were based on hospitals’ historical base DRG payments
rather than future ones; as the program only started on October 1, 2018, actual penalty amounts in dollars will depend on
the total billing to CMS in fiscal year 2019.

.30

Abbreviations: ADI, Area Deprivation Index; CMI, case mix index; FPL, federal
poverty level; NA, not applicable; OR, odds ratio.

Conclusions

tals are judged against the median performance in their own
peer group, hospitals in the highest stratum of dual enrollment are held to a different benchmark than are hospitals in
lower strata. Given the strength of evidence demonstrating

Stratification of the HRRP was associated with a significant shift
in hospital penalties for excess readmissions. Policymakers
should monitor the association of this change with trends in
readmission rates as well as hospital financial performance as
the policy is fully implemented.
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